# A-135 anti-ballistic missile system
The A-135 is a Russian anti-ballistic missile system deployed around Moscow, designed to defend the capital and its surrounding industrial region against a limited ballistic missile attack using nuclear-armed interceptors and the Don-2N battle-management radar. It is the successor to the first-generation A-35 system and remains the only strategic missile defense system Russia operates, covering Moscow rather than the country as a whole.[1](https://www.globalsecurity.org.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/a-135.htm) • [2](https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/media/Missile-Defense-In-Russia.pdf)
| Key fact | Detail |
|---|---|
| Purpose | Defense of Moscow against a limited strike; Soviet estimates put its capability at intercepting about 1-2 modern ICBMs[3](https://russianforces.org/blog/2012/10/very_modest_expectations_sovie.shtml) |
| Authorization | USSR Council of Ministers Resolution No. 376-119 of 10 June 1971 authorized the system's creation[4](https://www.generalstaff.org/WW3/GEO/CW_Geodesy_A135_ABM.htm) |
| Treaty limits | The 1972 ABM Treaty allowed 100 interceptors at one site; A-135 filled the quota with 32 exoatmospheric Gorgon and 68 endoatmospheric Gazelle interceptors[5](https://static.rusi.org/201211_op_atomic_accounting.pdf) |
| Current force | 68 silo-based 53T6 (Gazelle) short-range interceptors at five sites near Moscow, plus the Don-2N radar at Pushkino; the 32 long-range interceptors were withdrawn around 2006[6](https://www.lasg.org/Modernization/assuring-destruction-forever-2022.pdf) • [2](https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/media/Missile-Defense-In-Russia.pdf) |
| Warheads | Gazelle interceptors use low-yield nuclear warheads designed to detonate between 5 and 30 kilometers above the defended area[5](https://static.rusi.org/201211_op_atomic_accounting.pdf) |
| Service dates | Accepted for pilot joint operations in 1990; began combat duty in 1995[3](https://russianforces.org/blog/2012/10/very_modest_expectations_sovie.shtml) |
| Operator | The Russian Aerospace Defence Forces' 9th Ballistic Missile Defence Division[5](https://static.rusi.org/201211_op_atomic_accounting.pdf) |
## Origins and development
Work on the A-135 program began in late 1968, when a group of specialists under A.G. Basistov was assigned to develop the concept for a new missile defense system for the Soviet capital. The concept called for a defense of Moscow against single, accidental, or provocative ballistic missile strikes, or a limited group of missiles launched from third countries or from a single rogue submarine.[7](https://pvo.guns.ru/abm/a135.htm) By the end of 1969 a two-tier interception concept, similar in structure to the US Spartan/Sprint pairing, had been agreed with the Soviet Ministry of Defense.[1](https://www.globalsecurity.org.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/a-135.htm)
On 10 June 1971, USSR Council of Ministers Resolution No. 376-119 authorized creation of the A-135 system, built around the "Amur" long-range interception firing complex and an "Amur-P" prototype. Early plans called for three Amur complexes 600 to 800 km from Moscow, backed by three S-225 air defense complexes. After the ABM Treaty was signed in June 1972, the system was redesigned so that all of its assets fit within a 100 km area around Moscow, and the S-225 complexes were removed; the S-225's short-range interceptor, the PRS-1 (5Ya26), was retained as the atmospheric tier under the new index 53T6.[4](https://www.generalstaff.org/WW3/GEO/CW_Geodesy_A135_ABM.htm) OKB Fakel was selected as the main contractor for the long-range two-stage exoatmospheric interceptor, the A-925/51T6.[4](https://www.generalstaff.org/WW3/GEO/CW_Geodesy_A135_ABM.htm)
The ABM Treaty shaped the deployment directly. The treaty limited each side to no more than 100 interceptors at one permitted site, and the A-135 filled that quota with thirty-two exoatmospheric Gorgon interceptors and sixty-eight endoatmospheric Gazelle interceptors.[5](https://static.rusi.org/201211_op_atomic_accounting.pdf) A prototype firing complex was built at the Sary-Shagan test range, where tests of the system, known there as Amur, ran from March to October 1987.[3](https://russianforces.org/blog/2012/10/very_modest_expectations_sovie.shtml)
## Structure
The deployed system centers on the Don-2N battle-management radar at Pushkino, near Moscow, which provides targeting data for the interceptors.[6](https://www.lasg.org/Modernization/assuring-destruction-forever-2022.pdf) When the system entered service in 1995 it also included the Dunay-3U (Cat House) radar at Chekhov, 16 long-range 51T6/Gorgon interceptors, and 68 short-range 53T6/Gazelle interceptors.[2](https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/media/Missile-Defense-In-Russia.pdf) The Gorgon interceptors were retired in 2006 without replacement, leaving the operational system with only the shorter-range endoatmospheric Gazelles.[5](https://static.rusi.org/201211_op_atomic_accounting.pdf)
Because the accuracy of the interceptors was insufficient to guarantee destruction of a complex incoming ballistic target, both the A-35/A-35M and the A-135 used nuclear-tipped rather than conventional interceptors. The Gazelle's low-yield nuclear warheads are designed to detonate between altitudes of 5 and 30 kilometers above the defended area.[5](https://static.rusi.org/201211_op_atomic_accounting.pdf) It has been reported that the interceptor missiles are normally deployed without their nuclear warheads installed, which would be stored at a facility about 80 km southwest of Moscow and mounted on the interceptors only during a "threatening period."[2](https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/media/Missile-Defense-In-Russia.pdf)
## Performance and limitations
Soviet estimates made while the system was being built put its capability at intercepting one or two "modern ICBMs." A 1985 Soviet government memo stated that the completed A-135 was to provide protection from a strike of 1-2 modern and prospective ICBMs and up to 35 Pershing 2-type intermediate-range missiles.[3](https://russianforces.org/blog/2012/10/very_modest_expectations_sovie.shtml) US assessments during the Cold War were similarly unimpressed: a 1989 report concluded that with only 100 interceptors the system could be saturated, and with a single battle-management radar at Pushkino supporting the missiles it was highly vulnerable to suppression.[8](https://www.ucs.org/resources/history-russias-anti-ballistic-missile-abm-system)
The system's radars, however, are actively used as part of Russia's space situational awareness and early-warning network, a role that continues regardless of the interceptors' limited capability.[2](https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/media/Missile-Defense-In-Russia.pdf)
## Service history
The Ministry of Defense did not accept the system after the 1987 Sary-Shagan tests and returned it to industry for further work. A second test series followed in 1989, and A-135 was accepted for "pilot joint operations" in 1990, with industry representatives operating the system alongside the military. It did not begin combat duty until 1995.[3](https://russianforces.org/blog/2012/10/very_modest_expectations_sovie.shtml) At the time of the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991 the system had not yet reached full operational capability, and post-Soviet budget cuts ended most work on associated upgrades.[8](https://www.ucs.org/resources/history-russias-anti-ballistic-missile-abm-system)
Testing continued at a low rate after deployment. November 1999 saw Russia conduct the system's first test firing since 1993, launching a Gazelle interceptor without a warhead from the Moscow complex.[9](https://pub.sergev.org/pub/pub/pub/doc/Russian-nuclear-weapons-2025.pdf)
## Modernization
Despite its limited capability, Russia has invested in upgrading the system. Around 2007 it completed modernization of the Don-2N radar, and in 2011 it began tests of a modified short-range interceptor, the 53T6M. An upgrade of the Dunay-3U radar at Chekhov followed. These efforts are linked to two larger projects: the Samolyot-M upgrade of the A-135, and the Nudol anti-satellite system. Samolyot-M traces back to the Soviet A-235 project outlined in the 1980s and appears to be a moderate upgrade of key A-135 elements, possibly including a new interceptor capable of exoatmospheric intercept; Soviet projections assumed the follow-on system would intercept 8-12 warheads accompanied by decoys and other penetration aids.[2](https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/media/Missile-Defense-In-Russia.pdf) In 2017 Russia began tests of a new modernized interceptor for the A-135 system.[6](https://www.lasg.org/Modernization/assuring-destruction-forever-2022.pdf) The move toward a successor reflects a safety concern as well: defending the Russian capital with nuclear-armed interceptors so close to Moscow is not the safest solution, and the Samolet-M design study, ordered by State Contract 406/1591 of 31 January 1991, aims at interceptor accuracy high enough to remove the need for nuclear intercept.[5](https://static.rusi.org/201211_op_atomic_accounting.pdf)
## References
1. [A-135 ABM, GlobalSecurity.org](https://www.globalsecurity.org.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/a-135.htm)
2. [Missile Defense in Russia, Federation of American Scientists](https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/media/Missile-Defense-In-Russia.pdf)
3. [Very modest expectations: Performance of Moscow missile defense, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (Pavel Podvig), 2012](https://russianforces.org/blog/2012/10/very_modest_expectations_sovie.shtml)
4. [Cold War Geodesy: Soviet A-135 ABM System Locations, General Staff](https://www.generalstaff.org/WW3/GEO/CW_Geodesy_A135_ABM.htm)
5. [Ballistic-Missile and Air-Defence Systems, RUSI (2012)](https://static.rusi.org/201211_op_atomic_accounting.pdf)
6. [Assuring Destruction Forever, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists / LASG (2022)](https://www.lasg.org/Modernization/assuring-destruction-forever-2022.pdf)
7. [Система противоракетной обороны А-135, pvo.guns.ru](https://pvo.guns.ru/abm/a135.htm)
8. [History of Russia's Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) System, Union of Concerned Scientists (2002)](https://www.ucs.org/resources/history-russias-anti-ballistic-missile-abm-system)
9. [Russian nuclear weapons, 2025, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists](https://pub.sergev.org/pub/pub/pub/doc/Russian-nuclear-weapons-2025.pdf)
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*Topic: Encyclopedia › Society and history › Conflict and security › Air defense and anti-aircraft warfare › Anti-aircraft weapons and systems › Surface-to-air missile systems*
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