# Alliance of Nation State Forces
The **Alliance of Nation State Forces** (تحالف قوى الدولة الوطنية, Taḥāluf Quwā ad-Dawla al-Waṭaniyya), also called the National State Forces Alliance, is a Shia political alliance in Iraq led jointly by former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and Ammar al-Hakim, formerly the leader of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq.[1](https://shafaq.com/amp/en/Report/3-Questions-The-Iraq-invasion-20-years-later) It was formed ahead of the October 2021 parliamentary election as a partnership between al-Abadi's Victory Alliance and al-Hakim's Hikma (National Wisdom) Movement, and it sits within the [Coordination Framework](https://www.edgepedia.org/coordination-framework), the coalition of Shia parties that has dominated Iraqi government formation since 2022.[1](https://shafaq.com/amp/en/Report/3-Questions-The-Iraq-invasion-20-years-later) • [2](https://www.stateoig.gov/uploads/report/report_pdf_file/q1fy2022_leadig_oir_508.pdf) • [3](https://shafaq.com/amp/en/Report/Explainer-Iraq-s-Coordination-Framework-and-Its-Rise-to-Power)
| Key fact | Detail |
|---|---|
| Native name | تحالف قوى الدولة الوطنية (Taḥāluf Quwā ad-Dawla al-Waṭaniyya)[3](https://shafaq.com/amp/en/Report/Explainer-Iraq-s-Coordination-Framework-and-Its-Rise-to-Power) |
| Leaders | Haider al-Abadi (prime minister 2014–2018) and Ammar al-Hakim, formerly of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq[1](https://shafaq.com/amp/en/Report/3-Questions-The-Iraq-invasion-20-years-later) |
| Composition | Merger of al-Abadi's Victory Alliance and al-Hakim's Hikma (National Wisdom) Movement[2](https://www.stateoig.gov/uploads/report/report_pdf_file/q1fy2022_leadig_oir_508.pdf) |
| Bloc membership | Coordination Framework, the ruling Shia coalition[3](https://shafaq.com/amp/en/Report/Explainer-Iraq-s-Coordination-Framework-and-Its-Rise-to-Power) |
| 2021 election | 4 seats in the 329-member Council of Representatives[4](https://data.ipu.org/parliament/IQ/IQ-LC01/election/IQ-LC01-E20211010/) |
| 2025 election | 18 seats, tied with Hadi al-Amiri's Badr Organization[5](https://en.964media.com/42359/?amp=1) |
## Origins and leadership
The alliance joined two figures who had each led separate Shia political vehicles after leaving larger formations. [Haider al-Abadi](https://www.edgepedia.org/haider-al-abadi), prime minister from 2014 to 2018, led the Victory Alliance, while Ammar al-Hakim, who had split from the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, led the Hikma Movement.[1](https://shafaq.com/amp/en/Report/3-Questions-The-Iraq-invasion-20-years-later) • [2](https://www.stateoig.gov/uploads/report/report_pdf_file/q1fy2022_leadig_oir_508.pdf) A U.S. Lead Inspector General report on the October 2021 election described the resulting National State Forces bloc as led by "Hikma Movement leader Ammar al-Hakim and former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi."
Both leaders came to the project with national-level profiles rather than large militia followings, which shaped the alliance's role inside the Shia camp: it supplies ministerial weight and institutional access to the Coordination Framework without commanding an armed wing of its own.[1](https://shafaq.com/amp/en/Report/3-Questions-The-Iraq-invasion-20-years-later)
## Place in the Coordination Framework
The Coordination Framework emerged as the central force in Iraq's post-2021 politics. After the Sadrist Movement won the October 2021 election and then withdrew its 73 deputies in 2022, the Framework's parties assembled the government of Mohammed Shia al-Sudani and, in September 2022, joined the State Administration Coalition with the [Kurdistan Democratic Party](https://www.edgepedia.org/kurdistan-democratic-party), the [Patriotic Union of Kurdistan](https://www.edgepedia.org/patriotic-union-of-kurdistan), and Sunni blocs including Taqadum and Azm.[3](https://shafaq.com/amp/en/Report/Explainer-Iraq-s-Coordination-Framework-and-Its-Rise-to-Power) The National State Forces Alliance is listed among the Framework's constituent members alongside State of Law, the Fatah Alliance, and al-Sudani's Furatain Party.[1](https://shafaq.com/amp/en/Report/3-Questions-The-Iraq-invasion-20-years-later) • [3](https://shafaq.com/amp/en/Report/Explainer-Iraq-s-Coordination-Framework-and-Its-Rise-to-Power)
Within that coalition the alliance occupies a distinctive position. American analysts group al-Abadi and al-Hakim among the Framework's figures seen as friendly to Washington, in contrast to leaders such as Hadi al-Ameri and Qais al-Khazali whose Iran ties are viewed with concern.[1](https://shafaq.com/amp/en/Report/3-Questions-The-Iraq-invasion-20-years-later) The Washington Institute's analysis of the 2025 election describes the alliance, led by al-Hakim and al-Abadi, as contributing a layer of political legitimacy that helps the broader Framework retain access to institutional power.[6](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pdf/view/19627/en)
Al-Hakim acts as the alliance's public voice. In May 2026 he stated that Iraq had overcome its political deadlock, formed a government, and was fulfilling its constitutional obligations, while identifying the decline in oil revenues as the country's main challenge.[7](https://ina.iq/en/politics/49103-al-hakim-iraq-has-succeeded-in-overcoming-the-political-deadlock.html) In December 2025 the alliance issued a statement framing the unity of Iraq and the preservation of national sovereignty as constant priorities requiring cooperation among all political forces.[8](https://www.ninanews.com/Website/News/Details?key=1274156)
## Electoral performance
**2021.** The October 2021 election was a severe setback. The bloc lost nearly all of the seats its component movements had won in 2018, and final results certified by the Federal Supreme Court credited it with 4 of 329 seats.[2](https://www.stateoig.gov/uploads/report/report_pdf_file/q1fy2022_leadig_oir_508.pdf) • [4](https://data.ipu.org/parliament/IQ/IQ-LC01/election/IQ-LC01-E20211010/) Preliminary commission figures had shown 6 seats before appeals and recounts reduced the total.[9](https://www.rudaw.net/english/categories/iraq/1062439) Its seats were spread thinly: one each in Basra, Dhi Qar, Diyala, and Muthanna in the preliminary count.[9](https://www.rudaw.net/english/categories/iraq/1062439) Governorate-level results show the pattern of near-misses. In Wasit the alliance took 18,627 votes (5.35 percent) for one seat; in Karbala 16,639 votes (5.66 percent) for one seat; and in Diyala 27,393 votes (5.70 percent) but no seat.[10](https://repository.mdx.ac.uk/download/6b67aaad7e58eac12475fc135fc146ec42aae3223f45fffb268c729bafcb97ce/2632300/HAlkhateeb%20thesis.pdf)
The 2021 result illustrates how Iraq's electoral rules affected the alliance. Under the new Single Non-Transferable Vote (electoral system: votes can't transfer; multiple seats per district) system with 83 small constituencies, the alliance amassed over 60,000 votes across Baghdad's 17 districts, more than three parties that did win seats there; one analysis calculated that under the Sainte-Laguë allocation method (A seat-allocating formula favoring mid-sized parties' vote totals) it would have earned five seats from Baghdad.[11](https://ormer.sakarya.edu.tr/uploads/files/68653e4fe21a7_3.pdf)
**2025.** The November 2025 election marked a recovery. The alliance won 18 seats, tying with the Badr Organization, in a 329-seat parliament whose full distribution was confirmed by the Independent High Electoral Commission with turnout above 56 percent.[5](https://en.964media.com/42359/?amp=1) The IPU records the National State Forces Alliance among the parties sharing the 99 seats won by the largest groupings in that legislature.[12](https://data.ipu.org/parliament/IQ/IQ-LC01/election/IQ-LC01-E20251111/) In Basra the alliance took two seats on 34,047 votes.[13](https://orsam.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/a-pre-critical-analysis-of-the-2025-iraqi-parliamentary-elections-basra.pdf) Among Shia lists, an Al-Bayan Center assessment ranked the alliance fifth within the Shia camp, behind the [Reconstruction and Development Coalition](https://www.edgepedia.org/reconstruction-and-development-coalition), State of Law, the Sadiqun Movement, and Badr.[14](https://www.bayancenter.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/The-2025-Parliamentary-Election-Results-and-Al-Bayan-Center-Polls%E2%80%A6-Under-Scrutiny.pdf)
## What the trajectory shows
The alliance's two results bracket the effect of Iraq's 2021 electoral change. In 2021, small constituencies and the single non-transferable vote penalized parties whose support was broad but geographically dispersed, and the alliance's 4 seats understated its nationwide vote.[4](https://data.ipu.org/parliament/IQ/IQ-LC01/election/IQ-LC01-E20211010/) • [11](https://ormer.sakarya.edu.tr/uploads/files/68653e4fe21a7_3.pdf) The 2023 amendment of the election law consolidated each province into a single district, a change that favors lists with well-organized candidates across a province; in 2025 the alliance more than quadrupled its seat count to 18 under the revised rules.[5](https://en.964media.com/42359/?amp=1) • [11](https://ormer.sakarya.edu.tr/uploads/files/68653e4fe21a7_3.pdf) Its standing within the Framework rests on this parliamentary weight combined with the leaders' dual usefulness: ties to the Iraqi state and international acceptability on one side, and membership in the Shia coalition that forms governments on the other.[1](https://shafaq.com/amp/en/Report/3-Questions-The-Iraq-invasion-20-years-later) • [6](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pdf/view/19627/en)
## References
1. [3 Questions: The Iraq invasion, 20 years later, Shafaq News](https://shafaq.com/amp/en/Report/3-Questions-The-Iraq-invasion-20-years-later)
2. [Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Quarterly Report, October 1, 2021 – December 31, 2021, U.S. Department of State OIG](https://www.stateoig.gov/uploads/report/report_pdf_file/q1fy2022_leadig_oir_508.pdf)
3. [Explainer: Iraq's Coordination Framework and Its Rise to Power, Shafaq News](https://shafaq.com/amp/en/Report/Explainer-Iraq-s-Coordination-Framework-and-Its-Rise-to-Power)
4. [Iraq Council of Representatives October 2021 Election results, IPU Parline](https://data.ipu.org/parliament/IQ/IQ-LC01/election/IQ-LC01-E20211010/)
5. [IHEC releases final election results, confirms full seat distribution, 964 Media](https://en.964media.com/42359/?amp=1)
6. [Pro-Iran Militias Are the Big Winners in Iraq's Election, The Washington Institute](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pdf/view/19627/en)
7. [Al-Hakim: Iraq has Succeeded in Overcoming the Political Deadlock, Iraqi News Agency](https://ina.iq/en/politics/49103-al-hakim-iraq-has-succeeded-in-overcoming-the-political-deadlock.html)
8. [The National State Forces Alliance: The Unity of Iraq and the Preservation of Its National Sovereignty Represent a Constant Priority, Iraqi News Agency](https://www.ninanews.com/Website/News/Details?key=1274156)
9. [Iraq election commission releases preliminary results, Rudaw](https://www.rudaw.net/english/categories/iraq/1062439)
10. [H. Alkhateeb, Wasit Governorate thesis, Middlesex University repository](https://repository.mdx.ac.uk/download/6b67aaad7e58eac12475fc135fc146ec42aae3223f45fffb268c729bafcb97ce/2632300/HAlkhateeb%20thesis.pdf)
11. [Türkiye Ortadoğu Çalışmaları Dergisi, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2025)](https://ormer.sakarya.edu.tr/uploads/files/68653e4fe21a7_3.pdf)
12. [Iraq Council of Representatives November 2025 Election results, IPU Parline](https://data.ipu.org/parliament/IQ/IQ-LC01/election/IQ-LC01-E20251111/)
13. [A Pre-Critical Analysis of the 2025 Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: Basra, ORSAM](https://orsam.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/a-pre-critical-analysis-of-the-2025-iraqi-parliamentary-elections-basra.pdf)
14. [The 2025 Parliamentary Election Results and Al-Bayan Center Polls… Under Scrutiny, Al-Bayan Center](https://www.bayancenter.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/The-2025-Parliamentary-Election-Results-and-Al-Bayan-Center-Polls%E2%80%A6-Under-Scrutiny.pdf)
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*Topic: Encyclopedia › Society and history › Politics and government › Political systems and ideas › Political parties and party families › Middle Eastern and African parties*
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