# Economic history of Qatar

The economic history of [Qatar](https://www.edgepedia.org/qatar) is the record of an economy that moved from pearl diving, through oil exports under British protection, to liquefied natural gas from the world's largest non-associated gas field (natural gas reservoir containing no oil), which by 2017 supported the highest per capita income in the world at USD 124,500 in purchasing power parity terms<sup>[1](https://etheses.durham.ac.uk/id/eprint/13306/1/Thesis_Diana_Galeeva_%28with_corrections%29.pdf?DDD35+=)</sup>. At the start of the twentieth century Qatar had about 27,000 settled inhabitants; by the mid-1980s the population exceeded 350,000, and in 2017 it reached 2,639,211, of whom roughly 300,000 were Qatari citizens<sup>[2](https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511558818.008)</sup><sup> • </sup><sup>[1](https://etheses.durham.ac.uk/id/eprint/13306/1/Thesis_Diana_Galeeva_%28with_corrections%29.pdf?DDD35+=)</sup>.

| Key fact | Detail |
|---|---|
| Pre-oil base | Pearl fishing was the main industry until the 1930s; pearls were exported to Bahrain and Lingeh across the Gulf<sup>[3](https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/isbn/9781789143119.html)</sup><sup> • </sup><sup>[4](https://www.perlego.com/book/1640131/the-creation-of-qatar-pdf)</sup> |
| Pearl collapse | The Gulf pearl workforce fell from 60,000 to 6,000 by 1944 as Japanese cultured pearls, at one-tenth the cost, destroyed the trade<sup>[5](https://apnews.com/article/sports-soccer-diving-qatar-doha-d30a912c546e2710e863c59be4c30089)</sup> |
| Oil era | 1935 concession to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company for 75 years; Dukhan discovery 1939; exports from 1949; production peaked at 570,000 b/d in 1973<sup>[6](https://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100047810668.0x000093)</sup><sup> • </sup><sup>[7](https://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100055965199.0x00005f)</sup><sup> • </sup><sup>[5](https://apnews.com/article/sports-soccer-diving-qatar-doha-d30a912c546e2710e863c59be4c30089)</sup><sup> • </sup><sup>[2](https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511558818.008)</sup> |
| Gas pivot | North Field, discovered in 1971, was estimated in 2009 to hold over 900 trillion cubic feet, 14.3% of world proven conventional gas reserves; first LNG shipment to Japan in 1997<sup>[8](https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5edf/5d5cc488002a57ebd96613bd2ef1bdfe6d49.pdf)</sup> |
| LNG capacity | Expansion from 77 million tonnes per annum to 142 MTA by 2030, via six new trains and 23 LNG ships<sup>[9](https://www.schweiz-katar.eda.admin.ch/dam/en/eda-cms/p9xTeFjLpN9C/Qatar-Economic-Report.pdf)</sup> |
| Fiscal dependence | Hydrocarbons generate approximately 80% of government revenues and goods exports; the sector's GDP share fell from 60% to below 40%<sup>[10](https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/65cf93926fdb3ea23b72f277fc249a72-0500042021/related/mpo-qat.pdf)</sup> |
| Sovereign wealth | Qatar Investment Authority foreign assets reached USD 526 billion at end-2024<sup>[9](https://www.schweiz-katar.eda.admin.ch/dam/en/eda-cms/p9xTeFjLpN9C/Qatar-Economic-Report.pdf)</sup> |
| 2026 shock | LNG exports fell about 96% from March to August 2026 after strikes on Ras Laffan; real GDP contracted 7.0% in Q1 2026 and is projected to fall 20.9% for the year<sup>[10](https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/65cf93926fdb3ea23b72f277fc249a72-0500042021/related/mpo-qat.pdf)</sup> |

## The pearling economy before oil

Until the 1930s Qatar's economy rested on pearl fishing, its main industry<sup>[3](https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/isbn/9781789143119.html)</sup>. Pearls, the country's main commodity until the advent of oil, were exported to Bahrain and to Lingeh on the Persian coast, where many Arabs were engaged in trade<sup>[4](https://www.perlego.com/book/1640131/the-creation-of-qatar-pdf)</sup>.

**Collapse of the pearl trade.** In the 1920s and 1930s the industry was destroyed from outside: Japanese cultured pearls sold at one-tenth the cost of natural pearls. By 1944 only 6,000 workers remained in the Gulf's pearl trade, compared with 60,000 two decades earlier<sup>[5](https://apnews.com/article/sports-soccer-diving-qatar-doha-d30a912c546e2710e863c59be4c30089)</sup>. Oil and gas rescued the country from the crisis caused by this collapse<sup>[3](https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/isbn/9781789143119.html)</sup>.

The pre-oil economy left a political legacy. Qatar resembled Kuwait in its dependence on pearling but had a weak trade sector and a weak merchant class, which produced a ruling coalition in which the Shaikh far more thoroughly dominated the merchant community than in neighboring states<sup>[2](https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511558818.008)</sup>.

## Oil discovery and the British protectorate era

Qatar became a [British protectorate](https://www.edgepedia.org/british-protectorate) in 1916<sup>[3](https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/isbn/9781789143119.html)</sup>. The oil concession followed two decades later under conditions that tied economic access to protection: Britain assumed responsibility for the protection of Qatar on condition that the Shaikh awarded the concession to the [Anglo-Persian Oil Company](https://www.edgepedia.org/anglo-persian-oil-company)<sup>[6](https://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100047810668.0x000093)</sup>. The commercial agreement between Shaikh Abdullah bin Qasim al Thani and APOC was signed on 17 May 1935, with a companion political agreement between HM Government and APOC on 5 June 1935; the concession granted APOC the sole right throughout Qatar to explore, drill, extract, refine, and sell petroleum and natural gases for seventy-five years<sup>[6](https://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100047810668.0x000093)</sup><sup> • </sup><sup>[7](https://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100055965199.0x00005f)</sup>. (Britannica records the 1935 agreement as being with the [Iraq Petroleum Company](https://www.edgepedia.org/iraq-petroleum-company); the India Office archival record names APOC<sup>[11](https://www.britannica.com/place/Qatar/History)</sup><sup> • </sup><sup>[6](https://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100047810668.0x000093)</sup>.)

**Discovery and exports.** British geologists drilled for and discovered oil in the [Dukhan field](https://www.edgepedia.org/dukhan-field) in western Qatar in 1939, with first discoveries recorded in the archival file for 1939–41; the concession was later transferred to Petroleum Development (Qatar) Limited<sup>[5](https://apnews.com/article/sports-soccer-diving-qatar-doha-d30a912c546e2710e863c59be4c30089)</sup><sup> • </sup><sup>[6](https://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100047810668.0x000093)</sup>. Commercial recovery began only in 1949, when exports started<sup>[11](https://www.britannica.com/place/Qatar/History)</sup>.

Production rose rapidly, from 2,000 barrels per day in 1949, the first year of exports, to a peak of 570,000 b/d by 1973; in the late 1980s Qatar was exporting about 250,000 b/d<sup>[2](https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511558818.008)</sup>. The revenue transformed living standards quickly: in 1978 per capita income stood at $11,400, roughly £5,700, with $2 billion in oil revenue that year<sup>[12](https://api.pageplace.de/preview/DT0400.9781317292425_A26567983/preview-9781317292425_A26567983.pdf)</sup>.

Oil money also shaped politics. Revenues stirred infighting in the Thani dynasty, prompting British intervention in the 1949 succession and eventually a palace coup in 1972 that brought Sheikh Khalifa ibn Hamad Al Thani to power<sup>[11](https://www.britannica.com/place/Qatar/History)</sup>.

## Independence and the gas pivot

In 1971 Qatar both won independence from Britain and discovered a vast offshore natural gas field it shares with Iran<sup>[5](https://apnews.com/article/sports-soccer-diving-qatar-doha-d30a912c546e2710e863c59be4c30089)</sup>. That field, North Field, is the largest non-associated natural gas field in the world, with reserves estimated in 2009 at over 900 trillion cubic feet, accounting for 14.3% of the world's proven conventional gas reserves<sup>[8](https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5edf/5d5cc488002a57ebd96613bd2ef1bdfe6d49.pdf)</sup>.

**The pivot took two decades.** In the 1970s gas was not perceived as a valuable resource, and much of the associated gas from oil was wasted in flaring amid an "oil mentality" in GCC countries; serious efforts to exploit North Field began only in the mid-1980s<sup>[8](https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5edf/5d5cc488002a57ebd96613bd2ef1bdfe6d49.pdf)</sup>. Between the mid-1960s and mid-1980s Qatar had already been transformed from a poor British protectorate noted mainly for pearling into an independent state with modern infrastructure funded by oil revenues and foreign labor<sup>[13](https://countrystudies.us/persian-gulf-states/68.htm)</sup>.

The infrastructure of the gas era followed. The [Ras Laffan](https://www.edgepedia.org/ras-laffan) gas hub was constructed between 1992 and 1996 at a cost of about US$2 billion<sup>[8](https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5edf/5d5cc488002a57ebd96613bd2ef1bdfe6d49.pdf)</sup>. Under a 1992 sales agreement with Japan's Chubu Electric specifying 4 million tonnes annually, the first LNG shipment was delivered to Japan in early 1997<sup>[8](https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5edf/5d5cc488002a57ebd96613bd2ef1bdfe6d49.pdf)</sup>. Later downstream diversification included the US$23 billion [Pearl GTL](https://www.edgepedia.org/pearl-gtl) plant, the world's largest GTL facility, which started in 2007 and entered production in 2011<sup>[8](https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5edf/5d5cc488002a57ebd96613bd2ef1bdfe6d49.pdf)</sup>.

Since 1995, when Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani replaced his father as Amir in a bloodless coup, Qatar rose to prominence on the world stage<sup>[1](https://etheses.durham.ac.uk/id/eprint/13306/1/Thesis_Diana_Galeeva_%28with_corrections%29.pdf?DDD35+=)</sup>.

## By the numbers

Since 2008 Qatar's economy grew at an average of 5% annually, but hydrocarbon revenues made up 87% of government revenue between 2017 and 2021<sup>[14](https://www.moph.gov.qa/english/NHS/Documents/QNDS3_EN.pdf)</sup>. A World Bank assessment puts the current figure at approximately 80% of government revenues and goods exports, with the hydrocarbon sector's share of GDP reduced from 60% to below 40% under successive National Development Strategies<sup>[10](https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/65cf93926fdb3ea23b72f277fc249a72-0500042021/related/mpo-qat.pdf)</sup>.

The gas price cycle shows directly in the external accounts. In 2022 the central government fiscal surplus reached around 10% of GDP and the current account surplus 26.7% of GDP, up from 14.6% in 2021<sup>[15](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2024/english/1qatea2024001.pdf)</sup>. In 2024 the current account surplus was 17.21% of GDP and the trade balance fell from USD 128,836 million in 2023 to USD 87,109 million<sup>[9](https://www.schweiz-katar.eda.admin.ch/dam/en/eda-cms/p9xTeFjLpN9C/Qatar-Economic-Report.pdf)</sup>. China is Qatar's largest trading partner at 14.3% of imports, followed by the United States at 12.6%, and Italy at 5.9%<sup>[9](https://www.schweiz-katar.eda.admin.ch/dam/en/eda-cms/p9xTeFjLpN9C/Qatar-Economic-Report.pdf)</sup>.

## Diversification and the World Cup era

Qatar National Vision 2030, adopted by Emiri Decision No. (44) of 2008, commits to a diversified economy that gradually reduces dependence on hydrocarbon industries, enhances the private sector's role, and maintains competitiveness<sup>[16](https://www.npc.qa/en/QNV/pages/default.aspx)</sup><sup> • </sup><sup>[17](https://www.npc.qa/en/aboutus/pages/legislativeInstruments.aspx)</sup>. The Third National Development Strategy targets 4% average annual GDP growth to 2030, 4% non-hydrocarbon GDP growth, 2% annual labor productivity growth, gross R&D of 1.5% of GDP, and cumulative net FDI attraction of $100 billion<sup>[14](https://www.moph.gov.qa/english/NHS/Documents/QNDS3_EN.pdf)</sup>.

Results so far fall short of those targets. Non-hydrocarbon growth averaged less than 2% between 2017 and 2022, and labor productivity declined 1.5% annually between 2010 and 2022<sup>[14](https://www.moph.gov.qa/english/NHS/Documents/QNDS3_EN.pdf)</sup>.

**The World Cup program.** The decade-long investment program ahead of the 2022 World Cup was worth US$200–300 billion, mostly in general infrastructure such as the port, metro, and railways, contributing on average 5–6 percentage points annually to non-hydrocarbon output growth<sup>[15](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2024/english/1qatea2024001.pdf)</sup>. Public capital spending totaled US$230 billion cumulatively in nominal terms during 2011–22, comparable to that range<sup>[18](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2024/english/1qatea2024002.pdf)</sup>. Construction of the stadiums reportedly cost US$6.5 billion, a small portion of the overall investment<sup>[18](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2024/english/1qatea2024002.pdf)</sup>. Near-term contributions from visitors' spending and broadcasting revenue were up to 1% of GDP, roughly US$1.6–2.3 billion in gross value added terms<sup>[18](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2024/english/1qatea2024002.pdf)</sup>.

[Real GDP](https://www.edgepedia.org/real-gdp) growth accelerated from 1.6% in 2021 to 4.2% in 2022, boosted by the event, which drew about 1 million visitors, of whom 0.3 million stayed in neighboring GCC countries<sup>[15](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2024/english/1qatea2024001.pdf)</sup>. Qatar became the first GCC country to introduce reforms to the Kafala labor sponsorship system<sup>[15](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2024/english/1qatea2024001.pdf)</sup>.

## Recent developments

Growth slowed and then re-accelerated: GDP grew 1.3% in 2023 and 2.3% in 2024, with non-hydrocarbons growing 3.7% against 0.6% for hydrocarbons, and inflation at 1.07% in 2024<sup>[9](https://www.schweiz-katar.eda.admin.ch/dam/en/eda-cms/p9xTeFjLpN9C/Qatar-Economic-Report.pdf)</sup>. In 2024 Qatar recorded its first net FDI inflow in five years, USD 460 million<sup>[9](https://www.schweiz-katar.eda.admin.ch/dam/en/eda-cms/p9xTeFjLpN9C/Qatar-Economic-Report.pdf)</sup>.

**The North Field expansion.** The installed LNG base of 77 MTPA was built across fourteen liquefaction trains commissioned between 1997 and 2011; a self-imposed moratorium on additional North Field development from 2005 was lifted in 2017<sup>[19](https://themiddleeastinsider.com/2026/04/22/qatar-lng-north-field-expansion-2026/)</sup>. QatarEnergy has committed nearly $30 billion to the first two phases, [North Field East](https://www.edgepedia.org/north-field-east) and [North Field South](https://www.edgepedia.org/north-field-south), lifting capacity from 77.5 million tonnes a year to 126 million t/y by 2028<sup>[20](https://guest.meed.com/qatarenergy-allows-extraa-bidding-time-for-north-field-west-topsides/)</sup>. The $13 billion NFE EPC package, covering four 8-million t/y trains, was awarded in February 2021 to Chiyoda and [Technip Energies](https://www.edgepedia.org/technip-energies)<sup>[20](https://guest.meed.com/qatarenergy-allows-extraa-bidding-time-for-north-field-west-topsides/)</sup>. North Field West covers two LNG trains with a combined capacity of 16 million t/y<sup>[20](https://guest.meed.com/qatarenergy-allows-extraa-bidding-time-for-north-field-west-topsides/)</sup>. The overall plan raises production from 77 MTA to 142 MTA by 2030, including six new LNG trains and a fleet of 23 LNG ships<sup>[9](https://www.schweiz-katar.eda.admin.ch/dam/en/eda-cms/p9xTeFjLpN9C/Qatar-Economic-Report.pdf)</sup>.

**Contracted buyers.** Sinopec signed a 27-year contract in November 2022 for 4 MTPA starting 2026, a second 27-year 3 MTPA contract in 2023, and CNPC a 27-year 4 MTPA deal in June 2023<sup>[19](https://themiddleeastinsider.com/2026/04/22/qatar-lng-north-field-expansion-2026/)</sup>. In Europe, Shell signed a 27-year agreement for 3.5 MTPA, TotalEnergies committed to 3.5 MTPA, and Eni signed for 1 MTPA destined for Italy<sup>[19](https://themiddleeastinsider.com/2026/04/22/qatar-lng-north-field-expansion-2026/)</sup>.

**The 2026 crisis.** Strikes on Ras Laffan forced a near-complete halt in LNG production: exports reportedly fell by 96% in the six months from March to August 2026, with an estimated revenue loss of around $24 billion<sup>[10](https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/65cf93926fdb3ea23b72f277fc249a72-0500042021/related/mpo-qat.pdf)</sup><sup> • </sup><sup>[21](https://www.calcalistech.com/ctechnews/article/52nlfbl3g)</sup>. Real GDP contracted 7.0% year-on-year in Q1 2026, driven by a 25.8% decline in hydrocarbon GDP, and is projected to contract 20.9% for 2026 before rebounding 26.7% in 2027, assuming LNG production resumes from early 2027<sup>[10](https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/65cf93926fdb3ea23b72f277fc249a72-0500042021/related/mpo-qat.pdf)</sup>. In H1 2026 total revenues fell 41.9% year-on-year, with hydrocarbon revenues down 56.1%, leaving a fiscal deficit of QAR 31.5 billion, about 10% of GDP<sup>[10](https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/65cf93926fdb3ea23b72f277fc249a72-0500042021/related/mpo-qat.pdf)</sup>; in Q2 2026 state revenues totaled approximately $7 billion against $16.4 billion a year earlier, producing a quarterly deficit of about $5.8 billion<sup>[21](https://www.calcalistech.com/ctechnews/article/52nlfbl3g)</sup>. QatarEnergy expects the first train of North Field East, an 8-million tpy unit within the 32-million tpy project, to start production in the first half of 2027, with additional trains dependent on the [Strait of Hormuz](https://www.edgepedia.org/strait-of-hormuz) crisis, because expansion equipment was still unable to reach the country; Ras Laffan repairs are expected to take three years<sup>[22](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/qatarenergy-says-hormuz-crisis-may-delay-lng-expansion-projects-2026-09-21/)</sup><sup> • </sup><sup>[23](https://www.ogj.com/pipelines-transportation/lng/news/55406923/qatarenergy-nfe-lng-train-1-to-start-1h-2027-ras-laffan-repairs-to-take-3-years)</sup>. In 2026 Qatar established Doha Investment, an investment arm managing the domestic portfolio of the [Qatar Investment Authority](https://www.edgepedia.org/qatar-investment-authority), focused on technology, industry, supply chains, and healthcare<sup>[21](https://www.calcalistech.com/ctechnews/article/52nlfbl3g)</sup>.

## References

1. [Diana Galeeva, *Adopted Power: The Rise of Qatar*, Durham University thesis](https://etheses.durham.ac.uk/id/eprint/13306/1/Thesis_Diana_Galeeva_%28with_corrections%29.pdf?DDD35+=)
2. [Qatar: oil and state formation (academic chapter citing Lorimer and el-Mallakh)](https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511558818.008)
3. [Michael Quentin Morton, *Masters of the Pearl: A History of Qatar*, University of Chicago Press](https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/isbn/9781789143119.html)
4. [Rosemarie Said Zahlan, *The Creation of Qatar*](https://www.perlego.com/book/1640131/the-creation-of-qatar-pdf)
5. [World Cup host Qatar leaves pearl diving past far behind, AP News](https://apnews.com/article/sports-soccer-diving-qatar-doha-d30a912c546e2710e863c59be4c30089)
6. [Coll 30/87(2) 'Qatar: Oil Concession', Qatar Digital Library](https://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100047810668.0x000093)
7. [Coll 30/137 'Oil: Employment by Petroleum Concessions Ltd.', Qatar Digital Library](https://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100055965199.0x00005f)
8. [Qatar's economy: Past, present and future, QScience Connect (2012)](https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5edf/5d5cc488002a57ebd96613bd2ef1bdfe6d49.pdf)
9. [Swiss Embassy Kuwait/Doha, Qatar Economic Report 2024/2025](https://www.schweiz-katar.eda.admin.ch/dam/en/eda-cms/p9xTeFjLpN9C/Qatar-Economic-Report.pdf)
10. [World Bank Macro Poverty Outlook, Qatar (October 2026)](https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/65cf93926fdb3ea23b72f277fc249a72-0500042021/related/mpo-qat.pdf)
11. [Qatar — History, Britannica](https://www.britannica.com/place/Qatar/History)
12. [Academic book preview on Qatar's economy (Routledge)](https://api.pageplace.de/preview/DT0400.9781317292425_A26567983/preview-9781317292425_A26567983.pdf)
13. [Qatar — Historical Background, Library of Congress Country Studies](https://countrystudies.us/persian-gulf-states/68.htm)
14. [Third Qatar National Development Strategy (NDS3)](https://www.moph.gov.qa/english/NHS/Documents/QNDS3_EN.pdf)
15. [IMF, Qatar: 2023 Article IV Consultation, Country Report No. 24/43](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2024/english/1qatea2024001.pdf)
16. [Qatar National Vision 2030, National Planning Council](https://www.npc.qa/en/QNV/pages/default.aspx)
17. [Legislative Instruments, Qatar National Planning Council](https://www.npc.qa/en/aboutus/pages/legislativeInstruments.aspx)
18. [IMF, Qatar: Selected Issues, Country Report No. 24/44](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2024/english/1qatea2024002.pdf)
19. [Qatar LNG North Field Expansion 2026: 142 MTPA Path, Middle East Insider](https://themiddleeastinsider.com/2026/04/22/qatar-lng-north-field-expansion-2026/)
20. [QatarEnergy gives North Field West topside bidders more time, MEED](https://guest.meed.com/qatarenergy-allows-extraa-bidding-time-for-north-field-west-topsides/)
21. [Qatar built its wealth on LNG. Now its biggest strength has become a vulnerability, Calcalist](https://www.calcalistech.com/ctechnews/article/52nlfbl3g)
22. [QatarEnergy says Hormuz crisis may delay LNG expansion projects, Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/qatarenergy-says-hormuz-crisis-may-delay-lng-expansion-projects-2026-09-21/)
23. [QatarEnergy NFE LNG Train 1 to start 1H 2027; Ras Laffan repairs to take 3 years, Oil & Gas Journal](https://www.ogj.com/pipelines-transportation/lng/news/55406923/qatarenergy-nfe-lng-train-1-to-start-1h-2027-ras-laffan-repairs-to-take-3-years)

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*Topic: Encyclopedia › Society and history › Economics and business › Economics › Economies and economic history by place › Economic history by place › Economic history of Asia and the Middle East*

*Initially written Oct 10, 2026 · Edited: Oct 11, 2026; Oct 15, 2026*

*Copyright 2026 EdgeChat AI, a subsidiary of Biostate AI.*

License: Edgepedia Community License 1.0, https://www.edgepedia.org/edgepedia/license
