# Justice and Development Party (حزب العدالة والتنمية) (Morocco)
**The Justice and Development Party** (حزب العدالة والتنمية, Parti de la Justice et du Développement, PJD) is a Moroccan political party described in international reporting as a moderate Islamist party, listed by the official Maroc.ma portal with a date of establishment in 1998.[1](https://www.e-services.ma/en/elections-legislatives-2026/partis-politiques/pjd/) • [2](https://apnews.com/article/fb47cf6b29b335c0429c8553cad40a5b) It led [Morocco](https://www.edgepedia.org/morocco)'s government from 2011 to 2021, won consecutive parliamentary pluralities in 2011 and 2016, collapsed to 13 seats in the 2021 elections, and recovered to 54 seats in the 2026 elections.[3](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-end-of-the-moroccan-model-how-islamists-lost-despite-winning/) • [1](https://www.e-services.ma/en/elections-legislatives-2026/partis-politiques/pjd/)
| Key fact | Detail |
|---|---|
| Name and abbreviation | Parti de la Justice et du Développement (PJD); Arabic حزب العدالة والتنمية[1](https://www.e-services.ma/en/elections-legislatives-2026/partis-politiques/pjd/) |
| Date established | 1998, per the official Maroc.ma portal[1](https://www.e-services.ma/en/elections-legislatives-2026/partis-politiques/pjd/) |
| 2011 result | 27% of parliamentary seats in the November 2011 elections, ahead of the Istiqlal Party with 15%[3](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-end-of-the-moroccan-model-how-islamists-lost-despite-winning/) |
| 2016 result | 31.6% of seats, an increased share over 2011[3](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-end-of-the-moroccan-model-how-islamists-lost-despite-winning/) |
| 2021 result | 13 of 395 seats (3.3%), 8th by seats, in the 8 September 2021 elections[1](https://www.e-services.ma/en/elections-legislatives-2026/partis-politiques/pjd/) |
| 2026 result | 54 seats, confirmed by the Interior Ministry on 25 September 2026[1](https://www.e-services.ma/en/elections-legislatives-2026/partis-politiques/pjd/) |
| Time in government | Led the government from 2011 to 2021[4](https://elpais.com/internacional/2026-09-24/el-partido-mas-proximo-al-rey-gana-las-elecciones-en-marruecos-con-una-abstencion-del-62.html) |
## Electoral history
The PJD has participated in all Moroccan parliamentary and local elections since its establishment in the 1990s.[5](https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/wps/ceip/0001653/) Before the [Arab Spring](https://www.edgepedia.org/arab-spring), analysts noted its unusual electoral behavior: the party had, in the words of a 2002 article by scholar Michael Willis, been "the party that did not want to win," avoiding confrontation with the royal court.[3](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-end-of-the-moroccan-model-how-islamists-lost-despite-winning/)
**Breakthrough in 2011.** After the constitutional revisions of 2011, the PJD won the snap legislative elections with 27% of parliamentary seats, far ahead of the pro-palace [Istiqlal Party](https://www.edgepedia.org/istiqlal-party)'s 15%.[3](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-end-of-the-moroccan-model-how-islamists-lost-despite-winning/) • [6](https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2018/01/moroccos-islamist-party-redefining-politics-under-pressure) Its secretary general, Abdelilah Benkirane, became head of government, an unprecedented situation in Morocco.[7](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/summer-reads/article/2025/08/26/mohammed-vi-the-king-of-unfinished-reforms_6744736_183.html) The party secured a historic second term by winning the 2016 elections with 31.6% of seats.[3](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-end-of-the-moroccan-model-how-islamists-lost-despite-winning/) • [6](https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2018/01/moroccos-islamist-party-redefining-politics-under-pressure)
**Collapse in 2021.** In the legislative elections of 8 September 2021, the PJD fell to 13 of 395 seats, a 3.3% share that ranked it 8th by seats.[1](https://www.e-services.ma/en/elections-legislatives-2026/partis-politiques/pjd/) Brookings scholar Shadi Hamid, a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy program at the Center for Middle East Policy, described this as losing nearly 90% of its seats, one of the more remarkable electoral reversals in recent years anywhere in the world.[3](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-end-of-the-moroccan-model-how-islamists-lost-despite-winning/) [Freedom House](https://www.edgepedia.org/freedom-house)'s 2023 country report records that the then-ruling PJD was trounced, with the National Rally of Independents (RNI) and the Istiqlal Party, both closely aligned with the palace, the primary victors.[8](https://freedomhouse.org/country/morocco/freedom-world/2023)
**Comeback in 2026.** In the parliamentary elections of September 2026, the PJD surged to 54 seats, according to provisional results announced by the Interior Ministry and confirmed as final on 25 September.[2](https://apnews.com/article/fb47cf6b29b335c0429c8553cad40a5b) • [1](https://www.e-services.ma/en/elections-legislatives-2026/partis-politiques/pjd/) It finished fourth, behind the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM) with 97 seats, the RNI with 66, and Istiqlal with 65.[2](https://apnews.com/article/fb47cf6b29b335c0429c8553cad40a5b) The government formed in October 2026 grouped PAM, Istiqlal, the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), and the Party of Progress and [Socialism](https://www.edgepedia.org/socialism) (PPS).[9](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2026/10/17/morocco-forms-new-government-but-except-for-women-very-little-changes_6758713_4.html)
## A decade in government
From 2011 to 2021 the PJD was Morocco's ruling party, the only Arab country where a democratically elected Islamist-led government lasted as long as ten years.[3](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-end-of-the-moroccan-model-how-islamists-lost-despite-winning/) In practice the party's power was limited: it had little control over national economic strategy, international relations, defense, or internal security, and on religion, the issue that animated its founding, it was constrained by the palace's control of the religious sphere.[3](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-end-of-the-moroccan-model-how-islamists-lost-despite-winning/) • [7](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/summer-reads/article/2025/08/26/mohammed-vi-the-king-of-unfinished-reforms_6744736_183.html)
**Leadership changes.** The palace, concerned by Benkirane's popularity, used the PJD's delay in forming a government in 2017 to replace him with Saad Eddine Othmani, a less popular PJD figure; the party complied under pressure from the king, triggering an internal crisis.[3](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-end-of-the-moroccan-model-how-islamists-lost-despite-winning/) Othmani served as prime minister from 2017 onward during the party's second term.[7](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/summer-reads/article/2025/08/26/mohammed-vi-the-king-of-unfinished-reforms_6744736_183.html)
**Constraints and blame.** From 2017 to 2021 Morocco faced mounting economic pressure, and the PJD-led government carried out controversial subsidy cuts and raised the retirement age; the COVID-19 pandemic worsened conditions.[3](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-end-of-the-moroccan-model-how-islamists-lost-despite-winning/) Because direct criticism of the king is prohibited by law, public dissatisfaction could be expressed at the ballot box against the titular head of government.[3](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-end-of-the-moroccan-model-how-islamists-lost-despite-winning/) The party was also blamed for the decision to normalize relations with Israel under the [Abraham Accords](https://www.edgepedia.org/abraham-accords), which came from the palace; for a rank and file that had long prioritized the Palestinian cause, this was seen as a betrayal, yet opposing it would have meant resigning from government en masse.[3](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-end-of-the-moroccan-model-how-islamists-lost-despite-winning/)
## Assessment
Analysts have offered divergent readings of the PJD's record. A 2018 Brookings comparison of Islamist parties in Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt argued that the PJD's pragmatism, flexibility, and ability to collaborate with other political forces enabled it to participate and survive politically in the post-2011 era.[10](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/islamists-parties-in-north-africa-a-comparative-analysis-of-morocco-tunisia-and-egypt/) After the 2021 defeat, Hamid argued that the bargain of access and survival in exchange for obedience had instead left the party fully coopted and alienated from its voters, citing Mohammed Masbah's observation that the PJD was repeatedly on the verge of implosion.[3](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-end-of-the-moroccan-model-how-islamists-lost-despite-winning/) A Carnegie Endowment analysis by Intissar Fakir, published in December 2017, had earlier judged that the most important legacy of the PJD's 2012 to 2016 tenure was its effort to negotiate a greater role for the elected government while remaining loyal to the palace.[6](https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2018/01/moroccos-islamist-party-redefining-politics-under-pressure)
The 2026 result of 54 seats, up from 13 in 2021, marks the party's return to a significant parliamentary presence after its 2021 collapse.[1](https://www.e-services.ma/en/elections-legislatives-2026/partis-politiques/pjd/) • [2](https://apnews.com/article/fb47cf6b29b335c0429c8553cad40a5b)
## References
1. [PJD — final 2026 results and 2021 references, e-services.ma](https://www.e-services.ma/en/elections-legislatives-2026/partis-politiques/pjd/)
2. [Morocco's Authenticity and Modernity Party leads in provisional election results, AP News (24 September 2026)](https://apnews.com/article/fb47cf6b29b335c0429c8553cad40a5b)
3. [Shadi Hamid (31 January 2023). The end of the Moroccan "model": How Islamists lost despite winning. Brookings.](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-end-of-the-moroccan-model-how-islamists-lost-despite-winning/)
4. [El partido más próximo al rey gana unas elecciones en Marruecos, El País (24 September 2026)](https://elpais.com/internacional/2026-09-24/el-partido-mas-proximo-al-rey-gana-las-elecciones-en-marruecos-con-una-abstencion-del-62.html)
5. [Party for Justice and Development in Morocco: Participation and Its Discontents, Columbia/CEIP](https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/wps/ceip/0001653/)
6. [Intissar Fakir (28 December 2017). Morocco's Islamist Party: Redefining Politics Under Pressure. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.](https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2018/01/moroccos-islamist-party-redefining-politics-under-pressure)
7. [Mohammed VI, the king of unfinished reforms, Le Monde (26 August 2025)](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/summer-reads/article/2025/08/26/mohammed-vi-the-king-of-unfinished-reforms_6744736_183.html)
8. [Morocco: Freedom in the World 2023 Country Report, Freedom House](https://freedomhouse.org/country/morocco/freedom-world/2023)
9. [Morocco forms new government, but, except for women, very little changes, Le Monde (17 October 2026)](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2026/10/17/morocco-forms-new-government-but-except-for-women-very-little-changes_6758713_4.html)
10. [Adel Abdel Ghafar and Bill Hess (22 July 2018). Islamist parties in North Africa: A comparative analysis of Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt. Brookings.](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/islamists-parties-in-north-africa-a-comparative-analysis-of-morocco-tunisia-and-egypt/)
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*Topic: Encyclopedia › Society and history › Politics and government › Political systems and ideas › Political parties and party families › Middle Eastern and African parties*
*Initially written Sep 17, 2026 · Reviewed: Sep 18, 2026; Sep 30, 2026; Oct 25, 2026 · Edited: Sep 18, 2026; Oct 25, 2026 · Last review: Oct 25, 2026*
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