# Kh-101 (Х-101)

**Kh-101** (Х-101; NATO reporting name AS-23 Kodiak) is a Russian long-range, subsonic, air-launched cruise missile developed to replace the [Kh-55](https://www.edgepedia.org/kh-55) and Kh-555, and **Kh-102** (Х-102; AS-23B Kodiak) is its nuclear-armed variant. The Kh-101 carries a conventional warhead of about 450 kg, while the Kh-102 is believed to carry a 250 kt nuclear payload, with some reports putting the yield as high as 450 kt.<sup>[1](https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kh-101-kh-102/)</sup> The missile is designed to defeat air defenses by flying a low, terrain-hugging flight profile beneath most radar coverage and by using radar-absorbing composite materials that reduce its signature.<sup>[1](https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kh-101-kh-102/)</sup>

| Key fact | Detail |
|---|---|
| Class | Air-launched cruise missile (ALCM), conventional (Kh-101) and nuclear (Kh-102) versions<sup>[1](https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kh-101-kh-102/)</sup> |
| Dimensions and weight | 7.45 m long, 0.51 m diameter, 2,300–2,400 kg at launch, no booster<sup>[1](https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kh-101-kh-102/)</sup> |
| Warhead | 450 kg conventional (HE, penetrating, or submunition) on the Kh-101; 250 kt nuclear on the Kh-102, with some reports up to 450 kt<sup>[1](https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kh-101-kh-102/)</sup> |
| Propulsion and speed | TRDD-50A turbofan; cruising speed Mach 0.58, maximum Mach 0.78<sup>[1](https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kh-101-kh-102/)</sup> |
| Range | 2,500–2,800 km per CSIS; Russian Ministry of Defense claims of 4,500 km are unconfirmed; IISS and Conflict Armament Research list 3,500 km<sup>[1](https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kh-101-kh-102/)</sup><sup> • </sup><sup>[2](https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/files/research-papers/2025/09/pub25-094-tracking-the-components-of-missiles-and-uavs-used-by-russia-in-ukraine.pdf)</sup> |
| Flight profile | Cruises around 6,000 m, descends to 30–60 m "tree top" levels; estimated flight endurance around 10 hours<sup>[1](https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kh-101-kh-102/)</sup> |
| Accuracy | Circular error probable reported as 6 m in one account, generally stated as 10–20 m<sup>[1](https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kh-101-kh-102/)</sup> |
| Service | Initial operating capability August 2003; entered service 2012; operational<sup>[1](https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kh-101-kh-102/)</sup> |

## Development

Soviet engineers began designing the Kh-101/102 in the late 1980s, and full-scale development likely began in 1995.<sup>[1](https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kh-101-kh-102/)</sup> The family was intended as the replacement for the Kh-55 (AS-15 Kent) and its conventional Kh-555 derivative, and production was underway by around 2010.<sup>[3](https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2022/04/ukraine-russias-air-launched-cruise-missiles-coming-up-short/)</sup> Unlike the Kh-55, which was designed as a strategic nuclear delivery system, the Kh-101 was developed from the outset in a non-nuclear version (the Kh-101 itself) alongside the nuclear Kh-102, and its reduced signature gives it increased survivability.<sup>[4](https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/medved-lebed-i-kradushchiysya-drakon/)</sup> The Kh-101 achieved initial operating capability in August 2003 and entered service in 2012.<sup>[1](https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kh-101-kh-102/)</sup>

## Design and flight profile

The missile is 7.45 m long and 0.51 m in diameter. It is fired without a booster, using the launching aircraft's momentum at release for its initial velocity, and is powered by a TRDD-50A kerosene-fueled turbofan.<sup>[1](https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kh-101-kh-102/)</sup> The turbofan's fuel efficiency is what makes the long range possible: a subsonic cruise missile trades speed for reach, and the Kh-101 cruises at Mach 0.58 with a maximum of Mach 0.78.<sup>[1](https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kh-101-kh-102/)</sup>

Its survivability rests on two measures. First, it flies a low-altitude path: after cruising at around 6,000 m, it can descend to 30–60 m above the surface, below the horizon of most ground radars, and its radar-absorbing composite structure makes it hard to detect.<sup>[1](https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kh-101-kh-102/)</sup> Second, its estimated flight endurance of around 10 hours allows long, indirect routings that complicate interception planning.<sup>[1](https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kh-101-kh-102/)</sup>

## Guidance

For midcourse navigation the missile combines inertial navigation, Russian GLONASS satellite navigation, and an electro-optical correction system that compares the terrain below against a map stored in the onboard computer. In the terminal stage it uses a TV imaging infrared seeker.<sup>[1](https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kh-101-kh-102/)</sup> Inertial navigation cannot be jammed but accumulates error over time, so it must be supplemented by the satellite and terrain-correlation updates to keep the flight path accurate.<sup>[5](https://static.rusi.org/russian-and-allied-capabilities-modern-strike-campaign-feb-2025-rusi.pdf)</sup> Reported accuracy varies: a circular error probable of 6 m has been reported, but the figure is generally stated as 10–20 m.<sup>[1](https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kh-101-kh-102/)</sup>

## Carriers

The Kh-101 is integrated on the Tupolev Tu-160 Blackjack, where the missiles are carried internally on a rotary launcher, and on underwing pylons of the Tu-95MS Bear-H; CSIS also lists the Tu-22M3/5 Backfire C and the Su-27IB (Su-32).<sup>[1](https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kh-101-kh-102/)</sup><sup> • </sup><sup>[3](https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2022/04/ukraine-russias-air-launched-cruise-missiles-coming-up-short/)</sup> In the war in Ukraine the Tu-95MS has been the primary launch platform.<sup>[6](https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/files/publications---free-files/strategic-dossier/pds-2025/complete-file/iiss_strategic-dossier_progress-and-shortfalls-in-europes-defence-an-assessment_092025.pdf)</sup>

## Combat use

**Syria, 2015–2017.** After the ISIS bombing of a Russian Metrojet airliner on October 31, 2015, which killed 249 people, and the November 13, 2015, Paris attacks, Russia struck ISIS targets in Syria. On November 19–20, 2015, Tu-95 and Tu-160 bombers launched a total of 32 Kh-101 cruise missiles, the combat debut of both the aircraft pairing and the munition.<sup>[1](https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kh-101-kh-102/)</sup> Further strikes followed near Idlib and Homs in November 2016, and on July 5, 2017, Tu-95 bombers fired several missiles that flew 1,000 km to destroy three ISIS ammunition depots and a command facility near Aqirbat. On September 26, 2017, Tu-95MS bombers flew 7,000 km from Engels Airfield through Iraqi and Iranian airspace before firing an unknown number of Kh-101s.<sup>[1](https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kh-101-kh-102/)</sup>

**Ukraine since 2022.** The Kh-101 has been a mainstay of Russia's long-range strike campaign against Ukraine, fired in salvos alongside [Kalibr](https://www.edgepedia.org/kalibr) cruise missiles, Iskander ballistic missiles, and large numbers of one-way attack drones.<sup>[5](https://static.rusi.org/russian-and-allied-capabilities-modern-strike-campaign-feb-2025-rusi.pdf)</sup> Conflict Armament Research field teams documented 18 examples of the missile in Ukraine between February 2022 and April 2025, the first in May 2022; one missile documented in the field had been produced only two months earlier, showing rapid production-to-deployment cycles.<sup>[2](https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/files/research-papers/2025/09/pub25-094-tracking-the-components-of-missiles-and-uavs-used-by-russia-in-ukraine.pdf)</sup> Russia has also modified limited numbers of older Kh-55SM missiles, removing their warheads and adding ballast, apparently to serve as decoys that divert Ukrainian air defenses.<sup>[7](https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/files/research-papers/2023/09/mdiukr/russia-war-in-ukraine_ballistic-and-cruise-trajectories.pdf)</sup>

## The Okhmatdyt hospital strike

On July 8, 2024, a missile struck the Okhmatdyt National Children's Hospital in Kyiv, Ukraine's largest pediatric hospital, destroying its toxicology department and damaging the intensive care, surgical, and oncology wards during a large coordinated attack that killed at least 43 civilians.<sup>[8](https://ukraine.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2024-08/Ukraine%20-%20protection%20of%20civilians%20in%20armed%20conflict%20%28July%202024%29_ENG.pdf)</sup> Danielle Bell, Head of the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, told a Geneva press briefing that analysis of video footage and assessment at the site indicated a high likelihood of a direct hit, and that the factors assessed suggested the hospital was directly hit by a Kh-101 missile launched by the Russian Federation.<sup>[9](https://www.unognewsroom.org/story/en/2257/un-geneva-press-briefing-09-july-2024)</sup> Ukraine's Security Service and open-source investigators, including [Bellingcat](https://www.edgepedia.org/bellingcat) and Molfar, likewise concluded that a Kh-101 struck the hospital, citing serial numbers on recovered fragments and visual characteristics matching footage of the missile seconds before impact.<sup>[10](https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-9-2024)</sup>

## Production and attrition

The war has tested both the missile's stock and its production line. By February 2024, IISS assessed that Russia had run down its pre-war stock of Kh-101s, and a serial number stenciled on a recently used missile suggested manufacture in the fourth quarter of 2023, indicating continued new production.<sup>[11](https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2024/02/moscows-aerospace-forces-no-air-of-superiority/)</sup> Post-2022 production missiles have undergone notable technological improvements that make the two iterations easy to distinguish, according to Gary Somerville, then a research fellow with the Open-Source Intelligence and Analysis Research Group at the [Royal United Services Institute](https://www.edgepedia.org/royal-united-services-institute).<sup>[12](https://www.rusi.org/news-and-comment/in-the-news/russia-caught-trying-conceal-key-detail-about-its-cruise-missiles)</sup>

Interception rates against the subsonic missile have also risen as Ukrainian defenses matured. In a June 2025 attack, the [Ukrainian Air Force](https://www.edgepedia.org/ukrainian-air-force) reported that 26 of 27 Kh-101 cruise missiles were intercepted, a far higher rate than against the supersonic Zircon.<sup>[13](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2026/06/03/russia-exploits-ukraine-s-shortage-of-patriots-to-strike-with-hypersonic-missiles_6754084_4.html)</sup> Russia has responded by firing the Kh-101 in concentrated salvos alongside Iskander systems, [Kh-47M2 Kinzhal](https://www.edgepedia.org/kh-47m2-kinzhal) aero-ballistic missiles, and hundreds of Geran-type drones, a mix designed to saturate and probe weak points in air defenses.<sup>[14](https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/insights-papers/evolution-russian-and-chinese-air-power-threats?pubDate=20260209)</sup>

## References

1. [Missile Defense Project, "Kh-101 / Kh-102," Missile Threat, CSIS, last modified April 23, 2024](https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kh-101-kh-102/)
2. [IISS and Conflict Armament Research (2025). Tracking the Components of Missiles and UAVs Used by Russia in Ukraine](https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/files/research-papers/2025/09/pub25-094-tracking-the-components-of-missiles-and-uavs-used-by-russia-in-ukraine.pdf)
3. [IISS Military Balance (April 2022). Ukraine: Russia's air-launched cruise missiles coming up short](https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2022/04/ukraine-russias-air-launched-cruise-missiles-coming-up-short/)
4. [RIAC. The Bear, the Swan and the Crouching Dragon](https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/medved-lebed-i-kradushchiysya-drakon/)
5. [Kaushal, S. with Suess, J. (2025). A Net Assessment of Russian and Allied Capabilities in a Modern Strike Campaign, RUSI](https://static.rusi.org/russian-and-allied-capabilities-modern-strike-campaign-feb-2025-rusi.pdf)
6. [IISS Strategic Dossier (2025). Progress and Shortfalls in Europe's Defence](https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/files/publications---free-files/strategic-dossier/pds-2025/complete-file/iiss_strategic-dossier_progress-and-shortfalls-in-europes-defence-an-assessment_092025.pdf)
7. [IISS (September 2023). Russia's War in Ukraine: Ballistic and Cruise Trajectories](https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/files/research-papers/2023/09/mdiukr/russia-war-in-ukraine_ballistic-and-cruise-trajectories.pdf)
8. [OHCHR (August 2024). Ukraine: protection of civilians in armed conflict, July 2024 update](https://ukraine.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2024-08/Ukraine%20-%20protection%20of%20civilians%20in%20armed%20conflict%20%28July%202024%29_ENG.pdf)
9. [UN Geneva Press Briefing, 9 July 2024](https://www.unognewsroom.org/story/en/2257/un-geneva-press-briefing-09-july-2024)
10. [Institute for the Study of War, Critical Threats. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 9, 2024](https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-9-2024)
11. [IISS Military Balance (February 2024). Moscow's Aerospace Forces: No air of superiority](https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2024/02/moscows-aerospace-forces-no-air-of-superiority/)
12. [RUSI (January 2024). Russia Caught Trying to Conceal Key Detail About Its Cruise Missiles](https://www.rusi.org/news-and-comment/in-the-news/russia-caught-trying-conceal-key-detail-about-its-cruise-missiles)
13. [Le Monde (June 2026). Russia exploits Ukraine's shortage of Patriots to strike with hypersonic missiles](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2026/06/03/russia-exploits-ukraine-s-shortage-of-patriots-to-strike-with-hypersonic-missiles_6754084_4.html)
14. [RUSI. The Evolution of Russian and Chinese Air Power Threats](https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/insights-papers/evolution-russian-and-chinese-air-power-threats?pubDate=20260209)

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*Topic: Encyclopedia › Technology and the built world › Engineering and manufacturing › Missiles and rocketry › Cruise and hypersonic missiles*

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