# Plum Island Animal Disease Center
The Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) was a United States federal research facility on Plum Island, an 840-acre island in [Long Island Sound](https://www.edgepedia.org/long-island-sound) off the coast of New York, dedicated to studying [foreign animal diseases](https://www.edgepedia.org/foreign-animal-disease) that threaten American livestock. Established by the Department of Agriculture (USDA) in 1954, it was operated in later years jointly by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and USDA, and its mission is being transferred to the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) in [Manhattan, Kansas](https://www.edgepedia.org/manhattan-kansas).[1](https://www.gao.gov/assets/a239785.html) • [2](https://usda.azureedge.us/about-usda/general-information/initiatives-and-highlighted-programs/national-bio-and-agro-defense-facility/frequently-asked-questions)
| Key fact | Detail |
|---|---|
| Established | 1954, by USDA, on a federally owned 840-acre island off the northeastern coast of New York[1](https://www.gao.gov/assets/a239785.html) • [3](https://www.gao.gov/assets/a248839.html) |
| Administration transfer | DHS assumed administration from USDA on June 1, 2003, under the Homeland Security Act of 2002; USDA continued its research and diagnostic programs[1](https://www.gao.gov/assets/a239785.html) |
| Laboratory type | Biosafety level 3 agriculture laboratory; biocontainment area of approximately 190,000 square feet with 40 rooms for large animals[1](https://www.gao.gov/assets/a239785.html) |
| Signature pathogen | Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), which could not legally be studied on the U.S. mainland, making the island location a legal requirement[1](https://www.gao.gov/assets/a239785.html) |
| Diagnostic role | USDA's Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory could diagnose more than 30 exotic animal diseases and performed thousands of tests each year[4](https://www.aphis.usda.gov/labs/about-nvsl/faddl) |
| Replacement | NBAF in Manhattan, Kansas, planned beginning in 2008, replaces and expands the PIADC mission[2](https://usda.azureedge.us/about-usda/general-information/initiatives-and-highlighted-programs/national-bio-and-agro-defense-facility/frequently-asked-questions) • [5](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVPUB-HS3-PURL-gpo252199/pdf/GOVPUB-HS3-PURL-gpo252199.pdf) |
| End of research | USDA stopped performing research at PIADC in 2025, with the critical diagnostic mission continuing during transition[6](https://www.oig.usda.gov/sites/default/files/reports/2026-07/50801-0002-31_FR_redacted__public.pdf) |
## Mission and pathogens
PIADC defended the nation against the accidental, natural, or intentional introduction of transboundary animal diseases.[5](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVPUB-HS3-PURL-gpo252199/pdf/GOVPUB-HS3-PURL-gpo252199.pdf) The economic rationale was large: the livestock industry contributes over $100 billion annually to the national economy, and a foreign animal disease introduced into the United States could cause severe losses.[7](https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-06-132) Scientists at the center identified the pathogens that cause foreign animal diseases and worked to develop vaccines against them, often with the assistance of scientists from other countries.[1](https://www.gao.gov/assets/a239785.html)
Diseases studied at the center included foot-and-mouth disease, classical swine fever, rinderpest, and a variety of pox viruses such as goat, camel, and deer pox. Some pathogens were zoonotic, meaning they can infect and possibly kill both animals and humans; those maintained at Plum Island included [West Nile virus](https://www.edgepedia.org/west-nile-virus), [Venezuelan equine encephalitis](https://www.edgepedia.org/venezuelan-equine-encephalitis), [Rift Valley fever](https://www.edgepedia.org/rift-valley-fever), and vesicular stomatitis.[1](https://www.gao.gov/assets/a239785.html)
**Foot-and-mouth disease.** FMD was the defining reason for the island site. Federal law prohibited studying the live virus on the mainland because the pathogen is highly contagious to livestock, and the 2001 outbreak in the United Kingdom, which led to the slaughter of over 4 million animals and losses of over $5 billion in the food and agricultural industries plus comparable losses in tourism, illustrated the stakes.[1](https://www.gao.gov/assets/a239785.html) USDA's Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory (FADDL) at Plum Island served as a World Organisation for Animal Health Reference Laboratory and a Food and Agriculture Organization Reference Centre, and was custodian of the North American Foot-and-Mouth Disease Antigen Bank, which stores concentrated FMD antigen that can be formulated into vaccines if an introduction occurs; the bank is co-owned by Canada, Mexico, and the United States.[4](https://www.aphis.usda.gov/labs/about-nvsl/faddl)
## Biocontainment design
All research was conducted within a specially designed, sealed biocontainment area. Doors carried air seals, the area operated at negative air pressure so air passed through a filter system before leaving the facility, employees and visitors changed into protective clothing before entry, and everyone showered when moving between rooms holding different animal diseases and before leaving. USDA procedures required all people and material leaving the biocontainment area to be decontaminated.[1](https://www.gao.gov/assets/a239785.html)
The biocontainment area totaled approximately 190,000 square feet and was unusual in housing 40 rooms for large animals across a three-level laboratory that also contained the air filtration machinery and the pathogen repository. Biocontainment areas at other laboratories typically consisted of smaller rooms housing smaller laboratory animals, which made controlling access to pathogens easier; anyone entering Plum Island's biocontainment area had access to all three floors.[1](https://www.gao.gov/assets/a239785.html)
## Security history
Security questions intensified after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and after a strike in August 2002 by 71 employees of LB&B Associates Inc., the contractor hired to operate and maintain the facility. USDA responded by contracting with [Sandia National Laboratories](https://www.edgepedia.org/sandia-national-laboratories) to evaluate security, hiring armed guards to patrol the island, and installing fingerprint recognition locks on freezers containing pathogens.[1](https://www.gao.gov/assets/a239785.html)
A 2003 [Government Accountability Office](https://www.edgepedia.org/government-accountability-office) (GAO) review found that security had improved but that fundamental concerns remained: physical security was incomplete, access to pathogens was not adequately controlled (eight foreign scientists had unescorted access with incomplete background checks), the guard force lacked authority to carry firearms or make arrests, and the incident response plan did not address a terrorist attack. GAO also judged the risk of pathogen theft higher than USDA had determined, noting that one striker had been convicted of tampering with the island's water distribution and treatment system on the day the strike began.[1](https://www.gao.gov/assets/a239785.html) By December 2007, DHS had implemented 18 of the 24 security recommendations, though several remained open.[8](https://www.gao.gov/pdf/product/95283)
## Governance after the 2003 transfer
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred the facility to DHS in June 2003, making DHS responsible for all operating and maintenance costs, while USDA's Agricultural Research Service (ARS) and [Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service](https://www.edgepedia.org/animal-and-plant-health-inspection-service) (APHIS) continued their work under an interagency agreement.[1](https://www.gao.gov/assets/a239785.html) • [3](https://www.gao.gov/assets/a248839.html) A coordination board with members from DHS, ARS, and APHIS oversaw management, research strategy, and operations, and a Plum Island-based Senior Leadership Group from the three agencies met at least monthly to handle on-site decisions such as scheduling limited laboratory space.[3](https://www.gao.gov/assets/a248839.html) A 2005 GAO report found the agencies were successfully coordinating current work but recommended shifting work that did not require Plum Island's unique features to other institutions; DHS subsequently pursued such shifts, including safety testing of livestock at mainland biosafety level 2 laboratories using a new non-live-virus vaccine.[7](https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-06-132)
## Replacement by NBAF and decommissioning
In 2008, based on the age of the laboratory and the importance of its mission, planning began for a new biocontainment facility that could accept the transfer of PIADC's scientific mission.[5](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVPUB-HS3-PURL-gpo252199/pdf/GOVPUB-HS3-PURL-gpo252199.pdf) That facility, the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility in Manhattan, Kansas, is owned and operated by USDA and will replace and expand on the PIADC mission, adding biosafety level 4 capability for work on zoonotic and higher-consequence threats.[2](https://usda.azureedge.us/about-usda/general-information/initiatives-and-highlighted-programs/national-bio-and-agro-defense-facility/frequently-asked-questions) • [9](https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-08-306r) The federal government planned an overlap of operations so the critical science mission would not be interrupted during the transition.[10](https://www.dhs.gov/archive/science-and-technology/national-bio-and-agro-defense-facility)
The transition ran behind the original schedule. USDA stopped performing research at PIADC in 2025, with the critical diagnostic mission continuing while NBAF awaited federal select agent program registration for its biosafety level 3 laboratories; USDA relies on a backup site as necessary in the interim.[6](https://www.oig.usda.gov/sites/default/files/reports/2026-07/50801-0002-31_FR_redacted__public.pdf) FADDL's work at Plum Island is moving to NBAF, where FADDL now also operates alongside its remaining locations.[4](https://www.aphis.usda.gov/labs/about-nvsl/faddl) GAO visited the facility in February 2025, when it was preparing for closure, and reported that DHS and USDA were decommissioning the laboratory, planning to destroy all laboratory equipment by autoclave and physical destruction rather than donation or sale, in part to reduce the risk of a malicious actor acquiring equipment from the laboratory.[11](https://files.gao.gov/reports/GAO-26-107729/index.html)
## References
1. [GAO-03-847, Combating Bioterrorism: Actions Needed to Improve Security at Plum Island Animal Disease Center (2003)](https://www.gao.gov/assets/a239785.html)
2. [NBAF Frequently Asked Questions, USDA](https://usda.azureedge.us/about-usda/general-information/initiatives-and-highlighted-programs/national-bio-and-agro-defense-facility/frequently-asked-questions)
3. [gao-06-132, plum island animal disease center:dhs and usda are successfully coordinating current work, but long-term plans are being assessed](https://www.gao.gov/assets/a248839.html)
4. [Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory – NVSL, USDA APHIS](https://www.aphis.usda.gov/labs/about-nvsl/faddl)
5. [Plum Island Animal Disease Center, govinfo (DHS publication)](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVPUB-HS3-PURL-gpo252199/pdf/GOVPUB-HS3-PURL-gpo252199.pdf)
6. [Suitability of the National Bio and AgroDefense Facility, USDA Office of Inspector General, Inspection Report 50801-0002-31](https://www.oig.usda.gov/sites/default/files/reports/2026-07/50801-0002-31_FR_redacted__public.pdf)
7. [GAO-06-132, Plum Island Animal Disease Center: DHS and USDA Are Successfully Coordinating Current Work, but Long-Term Plans Are Being Assessed (2005)](https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-06-132)
8. [GAO-08-306R, Plum Island Animal Disease Center: DHS Has Made Significant Progress Implementing Security Recommendations (2007)](https://www.gao.gov/pdf/product/95283)
9. [GAO-08-306R product page, U.S. GAO](https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-08-306r)
10. [National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility, DHS Science and Technology (archived)](https://www.dhs.gov/archive/science-and-technology/national-bio-and-agro-defense-facility)
11. [GAO-26-107729, Public Health Preparedness: Action Needed to Address National and Biosecurity Risks Associated with Disposal of Federal Laboratory Equipment](https://files.gao.gov/reports/GAO-26-107729/index.html)
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*Topic: Encyclopedia › Life and health › Applied biology and nonhuman health › Veterinary medicine and animal health › Animal disease and health › Epizootics and foreign animal disease › High-containment research facilities*
*Initially written Sep 17, 2026 · Reviewed: Oct 21, 2026 · Edited: Oct 15, 2026; Oct 21, 2026 · Last review: Oct 21, 2026*
*Copyright 2026 EdgeChat AI, a subsidiary of Biostate AI.*
License: Edgepedia Community License 1.0, https://www.edgepedia.org/edgepedia/license