General · EdgepediaOctober 10, 20267 min read

Vladimir Pastukhov

Vladimir Pastukhov (Владимир Борисович Пастухов; born 1963) is a political scientist, lawyer, and publicist, born in Kyiv, Ukraine (then part of the Soviet Union), who writes on Russian constitutionalism, political culture, and the nature of the Putin regime from exile in London²⁰. He is an Honorary Professor at University College London's School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES)¹, was entered into Russia's register of foreign agents on 5 May 2023², and is known for his Putin scholarship³.

Key fact	Detail
Born	1963⁴
Education	Law degree from Kyiv University; PhD and doctoral (doktor politicheskikh nauk) theses defended⁵^•⁶
Career in Russia	Research director, Institute of Law and Public Policy, Moscow, 1999–2008; professor at the Higher School of Economics; advisor to the Chairman of the Constitutional Court⁷^•⁵^•⁸
Emigration	Left Russia for London in 2008 amid criminal prosecution connected to his legal work for Hermitage Capital Management⁵
Output	Several books and over 200 scholarly articles on constitutional law and political science, including Restoration instead of Reformation (2012)⁷^•⁶
Current posts	Honorary Professor, UCL SSEES; listed by Polis as professor at St Antony's College, Oxford¹^•²
Status in Russia	Entered the foreign-agent register on 05.05.2023²

Education and career in Russia

Pastukhov graduated from the Faculty of Law of Kyiv University. After defending first his PhD thesis and then his doctoral thesis, he did research work in political science and legal issues at the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow⁵. From 1995 to 1999 he was a senior researcher at the Institute of Latin America of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Comparative Political Studies⁷.

In 1999 he obtained the status of a lawyer and in that capacity represented the interests of the Hermitage Capital Management fund, for which Sergei Magnitsky also worked⁵. Also in 1999 he was appointed research director of the Institute of Law and Public Policy in Moscow, a position he held until 2008⁷. He has been a professor of political science at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow and at the Russian Academy of Sciences⁵, and openDemocracy's author page lists him as an advisor to the Chairman of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation⁸.

Emigration and current affiliations

Due to criminal prosecution related to his work for Hermitage Capital Management, Pastukhov was forced to emigrate to London in 2008⁵. The Library of Congress authority record describes him as an attorney who left Russia in 2008 after acting as an attorney in the Hermitage court trial and as working at St Antony's College, Oxford⁶. UK Companies House records him as a British national resident in the United Kingdom, with a company directorship from 7 January 2019 to 13 November 2023 and a new appointment on 13 March 2024⁴.

His current institutional base is UCL SSEES, where he is an Honorary Professor¹. The Jamestown Foundation lists him as an analyst on constitutional law and political science and has published his commentary⁹.

Academic work and key theses

Pastukhov is the author of several books and over 200 scholarly articles on constitutional law and political science, focused on Russian political culture and the historical and social background of Russian power⁷. His 2012 book Restavratsiya vmesto reformatsii (Restoration instead of Reformation) is recorded by the Library of Congress⁶. His Polis articles span two decades and trace his themes: "From Statehood to the State: Europe and Russia" (1994), "Russia — 2000: Civilizational Choice and Constitutional Chance" (1998), "The Ukrainian Revolution and the Russian Counter-Revolution" (2010), "Presentiment of Civil War. From the 'Nomenklatura' to the 'Kleptocracy'" (2011), "The Demon of Law. Russian Law as Escaping Reality" (2011), and "At the Constitutional Frontier" (2013)¹⁰^•².

The axis of his constitutional argument is autocracy versus federation. In his Institute of Modern Russia essay "The Hamlet Question: Autocracy or Federation?" he argues that this is the key issue on which the future of Russian constitutionalism depends, and that Russia's ability to create a nation-state hinges on its ability to create a viable federation¹¹. All previous Russian constitutions, he contends, merely "put a new face on the empire"; the real task of Russian constitutionalism is to put an end to empire once and for all, and Russian federalism "remains to be created", since it has never existed in practice and no theoretical model for it has been developed¹¹. He treats Russian autocracy as an evolutionary answer to historical challenges of natural and cultural conditions, arguing that a "flat" (unitary) government will be autocratic regardless of who holds power, and proposes a two-tiered constitutional reform beginning with a "constitutional transitional period"¹¹.

The practical corollary is decentralization on a large scale. In an interview for the Khodorkovsky platform he argued that Russia can become a constitutional state only through federalization into roughly 20 to 25 relatively autonomous formations with a common military and foreign policy; only then, he says, can an alternative to the current system be hoped for¹².

His framing of the Putin regime

Pastukhov's descriptions of the regime are deliberately historical rather than sociological in the usual sense. In an Odessa Journal interview he characterized Putin's regime, in its social and historical substance, as very close to medieval models: a dictatorship of the nomenklatura, a kind of "new nobility", formally carried out in the interests of the "new Cossackdom"³.

In place of the post-communist boyars, he said, had come the post-communist nomenklatura nobility, the serving class of the 21st century, and the rebuilt power structure could have a large reserve of stability and withstand economic crisis, even war¹³.

His account of the war's origin follows from this framing. In a November 30, 2023 Novaya Gazeta essay he described the current stage as "the last and highest stage of decay of Russian imperialism", marked by very high instability, an authoritarianism that cannot exist without war¹⁵.

Public commentary and media presence

Pastukhov reaches a public audience through several émigré channels. He has a regular program on the Echo station, «Чисто конкретная политика» ("Purely Concrete Politics")¹⁶. His Telegram channel @v_pastukhov has about 155,000 subscribers and posts roughly 0.5 posts per day under the Politics category, according to a channel-metrics site¹⁷. He has published analytical essays via the Jamestown Foundation¹⁸ and op-eds in Novaya Gazeta¹⁵, and he is one of the authors of the Institute of Modern Russia report Constitutional Crisis in Russia and How to Resolve It⁹. Before emigration he addressed audiences including the State Duma and the Moscow City Mayor's Office¹⁸.

The war and recent developments

Pastukhov places the Russia–Ukraine war inside a longer arc. His February 2024 UCL lecture, "Disintegration of the Soviet Empire, phase 2: Non-Civil War in Russia and Ukraine", framed the wars in Russia and Ukraine as part of the ongoing collapse of the Soviet empire over thirty-five years, and argued that the end of hostilities may be a prologue to the next phase of disintegration⁵.

On the Echo program he has said that after four years of war he had to rewrite his life's work, the «Понятийная Конституция» ("Conceptual Constitution"), and write a «Конституция русского беспредела» ("Constitution of Russian Lawlessness")¹⁶. He also argues that Putin strategically needs war as a stabilizer but that this concrete war has stopped being a stabilizer and risks becoming a destabilizer¹⁴.

In July 2025 he set out a scenario map. The single "red zone" scenario for the regime, he argued, is Putin dying without victory and with the war unfinished, which could push a post-Putin transition toward revolution; he assessed Putin personally as the most protected element of the system, with neither revolution nor coup likely to threaten him before his death¹⁹. He identified two exit paths after Putin: a softer bureaucratic authoritarianism with recycled Putin-era elites and liberals, or a harsh revolutionary dictatorship leading to open civil conflict, especially in areas where ethnic and confessional minorities live compactly¹⁹.

References

Initially written Oct 10, 2026 · Edited: Oct 11, 2026; Oct 12, 2026; Oct 15, 2026